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The increased demand for fuelwoodmay have the side-effect of unsustainable use of forest
resource. The case of Kosovo fuelwood production is of a peculiar relevance to studying the
drivers of the unsustainable patterns of forest biomass use in a post-war and poor eco-
nomic context. The domestic market demand for fuelwood in Kosovo is estimated at more
than 1.5 hm3, while the legal supply, including imports, is slightly higher than 0.3 hm3.
Illegal logging for satisfying Kosovo population fuelwood needs is therefore widespread.
The annual illegal fuelwood harvesting represents a market of up to 21.6 million euro and
is done mostly by well organised groups of individuals, with market-oriented behaviour,
acting rather in State than in private forests. After identifying the drivers of illegal logging
for fuelwood, the paper provides an analysis of fuelwood extraction in relation with
property rights distribution, structured along two lines: a) which was the evolution of the
management and exclusion rights over the forest resource during the latest decades; b)
which are the current enforcement mechanisms of the property rights and how are they
performing. The paper describes a decades-long history of mismatching economic prop-
erty rights arrangements. Thus, the dispute between the central agency and municipalities
in performing exclusion rights on timber extraction definitely weakened the Kosovo sys-
tem of law enforcement. Currently, the enforcement mechanism proved to be unhelpful in
controlling illegal logging. As result, most of the Kosovo fuelwood production is based on
an de facto open-access regime.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Forests in Kosovo cover 42% of the country and harbour the
potential to supply biomass for energy purposes. The high
density of the Kosovo population (175e220 inhabitants per74; fax: þ40 (0) 23052008
iaud@gmail.com (L. Bouri
028
rved.km2) and the large proportion of the population living in rural
areas, e.g. 61% according to Population Census from 2011 [1]
put a high pressure on forest resource. From this point of
view, Kosovo needs to implement effective and coordinated
forest management policies, and to promote a more efficient
use of fuelwood [2]. The sustainable use of the forest resource0.
aud).
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ties, reflected in the way the rules for forest management are
implemented and enforced.
Fuelwood represents 20% of the total of Kosovo's energy
consumption [2]. The residential sector is the main consumer
of fuelwood (50%), followed by the service sector (25%), in-
dustry (15%) and agriculture (10%) [2]. Of the total Kosovo
forest area that is 481,000 ha, public forestlands represent 62%
with a standing volume of 33.5 hm3 versus 19.5 hm3 (million
cubic metre) in private forests [3]. A number of 120,000 forest
owners shares 180,800 ha, that is an average private owner-
ship of 1.5 ha split in 2.4 parcels [3]. Coppice forest dominates
the forest area with 84%. As a result of intensive cuttings, 58%
of the public forest and 81% of the private forest are less than
60 years old [4]. The national forest inventory from 2002 esti-
mated the annual allowable cut around 0.9 hm3 gross, of
which 55% is fuelwood [5]. However, in the past decade, the
annual allowable cut calculated and legally available for har-
vesting through the current system of forest management
planning was under 0.2 hm3 [6].
The case of Kosovo fuelwood production is of a peculiar
relevance to studying the drivers of the unsustainable pat-
terns of forest biomass use in a post-war and poor economic
context. A property-rights-based approach is used to com-
plete and refine the standard explanation of illegal logging as
policy failures in terms of law enforcement [7e9]. Although
the issue of resource depletion andweak enforcement is quite
well documented (see 152 cases in nine countries synthetized
by Chhatre and Agrawal [9], there are no studies addressing
the fuelwood overharvesting and weak law enforcement in
European institutional context. The drivers of illegal logging,
important from the perspective of designing appropriate pol-
icies, are not well documented either [10], few studies have
beenmade in post-socialist countries [11,12], however theft in
general is well addressed by the literature on the criminal
enforcement [13e16]. Following a comprehensive analysis of
property rights regimes by Kissling-N€af and Bisang [17], the
study was structured along two lines: a) the property rights
over the forest resource and the possibility of exclusion from
the consumption of fuelwood; b) the enforcement mecha-
nisms of the property rights. The study aims to identify how
the property rights on forestland and timber (stock and flow)
were established, policed and enforced in the latest decades in
Kosovo to assess the impact of the economic rights delinea-
tion on the legality of fuelwood production and trade.2. The challenges of the fuelwood
sustainable production
Sustainable fuelwood production challenges in Kosovo are:
the changing institutional context, the degradation of the
resource, the high amount of illegal logging and the extremely
unbalanced ratio between the demand and supply.
In the last decade, Kosovo has attracted the attention of
international donors supporting sustainable development of
the forest sector. A forest strategy was adopted in 2009 and a
new forest law is under debate (March, 2014). The Kosovo
public authority for forests is the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Rural Development. The management of publicforests and the law enforcement in private forests are per-
formed jointly by a central agencywith six regional offices and
by the municipalities (in number of 30). Forest inspectors,
untrusted with control of law implementation, are currently
acting within the central agency. Though the changes in the
institutional settings for the natural resources have happened
everywhere in countries in transition, in Kosovo they occurred
in the particular context of war (1999), of United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (after
1999) and new Kosovo State establishment (2008) with first
democratic elections and therefore first sovereign govern-
ment in late 2010.
The war and post-war disorders led to a large degradation
of the forests by logging, fire and illegal hunting [18e20].While
the coniferous forests are put at risk due to fire, bark beetles,
or a lack of the thinning operations, the coppice forests suffer
from heavy harvesting in some locations and from a lack of
management interventions in some other locations [3]. Only
about one-third of the forest area is considered ecologically
healthy and economically productive and most of the
remaining forests consist of immature trees and bushy low
forests that are cut periodically for fuelwood [21].
Illegal logging is connected with forestry activities such as
wood harvesting, processing, transporting and trading in
violation of the law [22]. Different estimations exist on the
amount of the illegally cut fuelwood. The studies available
[23,24,4e6] depict a situation unique in Europe. For example,
the ratio between the legal and illegal logging is at least 1:1,
but it might also be 1:5. The average annual value of the
damages due to illegal activities was estimated at 1.5 million
euro [24], while 40% of the public forests and 30% of the private
forests are affected by illegal logging [6,3]. The latest national
forestry inventory [25] assessed that over 90% of the annual
fellings do not comply with the rules of law. Moreover, during
the period 2002e2012 the annual harvesting has been 1.6 hm3
compared with 1.45 hm3 recommended as sustainable annual
harvest [25] and compared with less than 0.2 hm3 officially
approved as annual allowable cut. One may estimate there-
fore that annual illegal logging amounted to 1.25 hm3 during
the period 2002e2012.
In the absence of more reliable data, and taking into ac-
count the share of fuelwood in the total primary wood pro-
duction that is 55% [25], the demand for fuelwood is used as a
proxy for illegal harvesting. Before the war, the population
was supplied with additional fuelwood from imports, and
alternative sources of energy (e.g. coal) were available. During
the 1999 war and in the post-war period, the economic diffi-
culties of households, the insufficient energy (oil, gasoline)
supply and the shortage of many other materials pushed the
population to turn to a more intensive use of the fuelwood for
house heating and cooking.
For example, some 50% of the 168,000 Kosovo families need
fuelwood regularly and their demand is estimated in one
study at 0.8 hm3 [26] and at 1.5 hm3 in two other studies from
2011 to 2013 [27,28]. Fuelwood is used by 85% of urban
households and by 100% of rural households, with an average
consumption of 9.6m3 per year [29]. Thus the annual domestic
consumption of Kosovo households would range between 2.4
and 2.9 hm3 stacked wood [29] or 1.56 to 1.88 hm3 solid wood
[30]. Therefore, if compared with the legal wood removal, the
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y 6 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 2 5e4 3 4 427sustainability of fuelwood production faces the challenge of
an extremely unbalanced ratio between the demand and the
supply. Hajredini and Kampen [30] have estimated the gap
between the demand and the supply of fuelwood at 1.27 hm3
solid wood. For an average fuelwood price of 30 euro per cubic
meter and an annual demand comprised between 0.55 hm3 [6]
and 1.2 hm3 [25,30], illegal cut fuelwood represents amarket of
9.9e21.6 million euro (Table 1), rather huge when compared
with the total income of the forest agency, based on less than
0.2 hm3 annual sales.3. Theoretical frame
3.1. Economic and legal property rights
From the viewpoint of the sustainable use of a natural
resource, property rights could be useful for society, only if
they could be policed easily [31]. The role of the State is to
define (legislative function of the State), interpret (judicial
function of the State) and enforce (police function) the prop-
erty rights [32]. Understanding the regime of timber harvest-
ing requires analysing the specific combination of the
ownership structure, the user rights of different actor groups
and the extent of the State interventions in the management
of the resource [17,33,34], particularly in the case of former
socialist countries [35] where important changes have
affected the economic and legal property rights structure.
Politics and statutory rule-making [36] defines the rights
structure. In the countries in transition, the legal rights were
defined within the scope of the land reform policies. In
contrast, the economic rights [37], e.g. the ability of the forest
owner to enjoy the benefits of the resource, were defined in
sector-based policies [38e40].
There is always a gap between the legal and economic
rights, due to the measurement costs of unspecified attri-
butes, the attempts to capture the benefits associatedwith the
rights and the institutions that constraint the capture [41] or
competition for the use of forests (i.e. who the other claimants
for forest utilization are), the possibility of exclusion and the
enforcement mechanisms [42,37]. The institutional context
determines the ability of the owners and managers to force-
fully maintain exclusivity of the rights [43]. The weak support
of the institutions against trespassers “encouragesTable 1 e Assessment of the illegal fuelwood market value an
Sources:
Estimation of the total illegal logging for fuelwood in Kosovo
From which, market-driven illegal logging of fuelwood (60%a)
Illegal fuelwood value in V (local price: haulage cost,
transportation cost, profit margin): 15V m3
Illegal fuelwood value at the average market price
in V (sold in the cities): 30V m3
Owners' losses - Damage value in V for stolen fuelwood
(calculated according to the Courts procedures): 40V m3
a Expert estimation, see also section 4.1.opportunism, by increasing the relative payoffs from illegiti-
mate versus legitimate activity” [35].
3.2. Enforcement of the property rights in forestry
Any structure of property relations requires a commitment
from the recognized system of authority that will collectively
enforce it [37,44]. Individuals who hold the exclusion rights
have the authority to set up the qualifications to be met in
order to have access to a resource [42]. Thismay be in the form
of timber harvesting permits, rules for marking trees, issuing
wood transportation documents, issuing administrative fines
in case of minor law infringements and charging in Courts
major law infringements, e.g. timber theft.
The enforcement of the property rights is performed in the
forest sector by specific management structures hiring forest
guards and by the forest inspection services. The forest guards
are responsible for monitoring the forest activities and pro-
tecting forests against timber theft. The forest inspection
services are in charge of limiting theft from state-owned for-
ests and ensuring that private forests are effectively managed
[45]. While forest guards are mainly liable toward the forest
owners, forest inspectors represent the State authority and
perform civil servant duties, yet their tasks are similar to
those of a “forest police”. The role of inspectors as public
agents is to ensure public enforcement by detecting and
sanctioning violators of legal rules [14].
3.3. Conceptual framework of the property rights
analysis
A conceptual model of the impact of the property rights
regime on natural resourcemanagement should avoid several
methodological biases, due to, inter alia, the diversity of
property rights regimes and of the State role [46]; the fact that
property rights structure is strongly dependent on context and
on the attributes of resource [41]; the fact that property rights
require normative judgements about the distribution of the
benefits in a society [44] and therefore property analysis is
often, yet not recognized, ideologically driven [47,48]. To
eliminate some of these biases, the study uses the analytical
framework developed by Schlager and Ostrom [42] clarifying
the position of the users according to the bundle of rights they
hold (Table 2). Two collective-level rights [42] are essential in








M V 4.95 10.8
M V 9.9 21.6
M V 13.2 28.8
Table 2 e The bundles of rights associated with position (Schlager and Ostrom, [42]).
Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorised user Unauthorised user
(e.g. illegal loggers)
Access X X X X X
Withdrawal X X X X
Management X X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation X
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resource and 2) the exclusion right, such as the right to
determine who will have access and withdrawal rights and
how those rights may be transferred. The owner has all the
five categories of rights, while the “proprietor” does not have
the right to alienate.
The study focuses only on a part of the forest resource, e.g.
the property rights on forestland and timber, because they are
fully specified and, theoretically, easy to police, as compared
to many other forest attributes.4. Method of the study and data collection
The empirical data are based on two categories of sources.
Historical data upon forest resource utilization in Kosovo in
the last five decades, available in different studies and docu-
ments, forest management plans and the forest laws and
regulations are combined with a sociological enquiry [49]. The
evolution of the property rights in forest sector and their
impact on timber extractionwere assessed via interviews. The
absence of available and reliable data imposes a two stages
approach of the data collection and a careful selection of
interviewed people, in order to ensure, as much as possible, a
non-biased interpretation of the illegal logging phenomenon.
In a first stage, 31 interviews were conducted with represen-
tatives of the central government: public servants from the
forest department from the ministry (7 people), forest officials
from the main forest agency (9 people) and from forest
inspector department (5 people), officials from other minis-
tries (justice, domestic affairs) (4 people), representatives of
the association of town councils and of forest owners (4 peo-
ple), and representative of forest industry (2 people). In a
second stage, seven amongst the 30 Kosovo town councils
were selected as case studies, based on the characteristics of
the forest resource and the extent of the illegal logging within
their territorial limits. At the municipality level, 17 interviews
were held with forest directors (7), forest technicians (7),
major (1) and local councils representatives (2). The interviews
were structured openly along two main axes: one narrative,
allowing the people interviewed to communicate their own
perceptions about the situation of forest harvesting and illegal
logging in Kosovo, before and after the war, and one explan-
atory [49], placing the interviewed people in the situation to
identify and explain which are the factors of success or failure
in protecting Kosovo forests against illegal logging. In total 48
interviews were held between December 2010 and December
2011, with an average duration of 50 min. Two workshops at
the central level (5 and 10 participants) and two at the mu-
nicipality level (8 and 7 participants) were organized with theaim to validate some preliminary results, e.g. the drivers of
illegal logging in Kosovo and its extent.
Data analysis is based on the qualitative content analysis
method. This procedure is rooted in the thematic codification
method, which identifies the differences and similarities/
commonalities between the actors in the target population in
relation to specific research items [50].5. Results and Discussion
5.1. The drivers of fuelwood illegal logging
The interviews and the organization of the workshops have
allowed the identification of three main drivers of illegal
logging:
1. Poverty-driven illegal logging (illegal logging for subsis-
tence) appears when poor people steal a few cubic meters
directly from forests (without any intermediary) because
they cannot afford (to buy) it. This form of illegal logging
does not represent more than 10% of the total amount of
illegally cut timber (Interviews 2, 7, 32). One must notice
that the Kosovo State is supplying fuelwood for free to poor
social categories, seven to ten cubic meters per year and
per family;
2. Illegal logging done by the forest owners themselves
(irregular or unauthorised cutting) happens when the for-
est owners extract fuelwood without the required official
forms (e.g. harvesting permits). This form of illegal logging
is widespread in private forests, and it may represent 10%e
30% of the total amount of illegally cut timber (Interviews 2,
7, 32). Partly, the irregular cutting is explained by the long
and bureaucratic official approval process or by the
absence of ownership title that is required for obtaining a
harvesting authorisation (Interview 5, 6, 7, 14);
3. Market-driven illegal logging is responsible for most of the
illegal fuelwood logging in Kosovo. Between 60 and 80% of
the illegal logging operations are driven by profit-seeking
activities with a view to meeting the fuelwood market de-
mand (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 32). Market-driven illegal
logging covers two forms: organized crime that is organ-
ised timber theft and illegal timber business that is over-
harvesting. The same people can undertake both forms of
illegal logging, according to the existing opportunities.
The illegal loggers are family or small size enterprise-like
organised and they are part of the local community. They use
several strategies to get access to the resource. They may buy
several tracts at once, for covering further illegal harvesting
Table 3 e The repartition of economic rights in Kosovo
State forests before the war and during the war.











Alienation No alienation rights No alienation rights
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than what they bought, preferably State or absentee owners
(Interview4, 5),which classifies their actions as timber theft. In
the bought tracts, the loggers may also cut and trade larger
quantities than allowed (Interview 5), which classifies as
overharvesting.Asdescribed inan interview, the incentives for
theft or overharvesting are high: “for 10000 euro paid in the
tenderingprocess, the loggerhasa returnup to10 timeshigher.
From the 20 m3 loaded in the truck, only seven or eight are le-
gally cut. Two or three truckloads per day are transportedwith
the same document of origin. A car travels in the front of the
truck to detectwhether the police is controlling the road traffic
or not” (Interview 6). A town council representative asserted
that in these situations “the loggers got accustomed to going
into the forests as in their own property” (Interview 6).
The well-organized traffic and trade of fuelwood enhance
huge opportunities for corruption (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 9, 10).
Illegal harvesting for trading purposes requires a “secured”
access to the resource involving attempting to steal timber,
corrupting and threatening the local forest guards, mis-
arranging the tenders and corrupting and threatening the
controlling teams. The investment in harvesting and trans-
portation machinery needs to be secured, therefore the cor-
ruption is carried out to avoid or prevent the confiscation of
the equipment or the interruption of the activity. On the other
hand, illegal logging and trade provide work to many people
within the chain while supplying a strong household demand,
so any attempt to close down the business would have social
consequences.
In relation to the social aspects, there are opinions that the
current illegal entrepreneurial activities should not simply
stopped, but should be converted in legally based activities
(Interview 6, 10) in order to create a wood local market, to
reduce price volatility and to modernise domestic production
[2]. Strategies to cope with illegal logging should consider the
underlying drivers of the illegal activities [22] and the fact that
market-driven illegal logging expressed an opportunity for
rent-seeking activities in the context of deep institutional
changes [40,51,52]. If the organizational capacity of illegal
loggers seems to be high, further analysis is needed to assess
the internal complicity of the local communities, as suggested
in the diagnostic framework for illegal logging elaborated by
HoneyeRoses [10].
5.2. The delineation of the economic property rights in
the state forests
Contrary to what happened in the other former European
socialist countries, the legal rights on forestland have not
changed over the last decades. Neither nationalization, nor
privatizations have affected the ownership structure in
Kosovo. The legal owners of the forestland and timber were,
as of today, the State (62%) and the individual private owners
(38%). Important changes have however occurred in the
delineation of the economic property rights. Thus, the orga-
nisations performing the management and exclusion rights
have changed over time.
In the socialist economy within the former Yugoslavian
State, themunicipalities managed the forest and forestland in
State ownership on a territorial basis (municipality area). Themanagement of the whole process of the forestry operations,
protection and utilization of State forests was entrusted to the
municipalities through local, self-financed forest companies
named “Ekonomi Pyjore” (“forest economies” in free English
translation) (Interviews 3, 10, 14). The municipality had the
right to use the products of the forestland, to self-finance and
self-manage the forest company with the right to employ and
dismiss themanagement staff, to operatewithin the budget or
to invest [24], all these economic rights being executed on the
State forestland. Additionally, they exercised exclusion rights,
notably, guarding against theft in private forests and delivered
harvesting permits to forest owners. Many elements of the
“Ekonomi Pyjore” were the same as those of socially owned
enterprises organized in the whole former Yugoslavia (Inter-
view 14). The fact that the municipalities had all the opera-
tional level rights and collective-level rights, except the
alienation right (they could not sell forest and forestland that
belong to the State) classifies them as “proprietor” according
to the frame defined by Schlager and Ostrom [42]. Thus, under
the State system prior to 1989, the rights to manage and use
the State forests and forestland and the right to perform
exclusion in State and private forests belonged to the mu-
nicipality within its territory.
At themoment when the political and ethnic conflict arose
in 1981, the Yugoslavian State attempted to restrict these large
local self-governance possibilities and to centralise the forest
management structures, by creating “Sharri”, a joint company
based in Prishtina, the regional capital of the autonomous
province of Kosovo. Most of the “Ekonomi Pyjore” entered this
organization, but not all of them (Interview 3, 10, 14), and the
process was terminated in 1989 when Kosovo's autonomywas
abolished.
Between 1989 and the end of the war (June 1999), all the
Kosovo's forests were managed by “Srbija Shume”, the public
company based in Belgrade that performed also the control of
law enforcement in private forests, including the exclusion of
unauthorised users (timber thieves). The rights given to
“Srbija Shume” in managing the State forests conferred to this
agency a proprietor position (Table 3). The centralisation of
the management structures in one institution (“Srbija
Shume”) meant in fact the termination of the municipalities'
forest management rights. The centralisation led to the firing
of the local forest officials, the reforming or the dismantle-
ment of the wood processing sector attached to the local
“forest economies” and perhaps the legal overharvesting of
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y 6 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 2 5e4 3 4430the resource as claimed by the interviewed people (Interview
6, 10, 12, 14). Yet this information could not be documented. In
this period, the legal basic foundations of property such as
reporting of changes and adherence to registered boundaries
and to planning regulations seem to have disintegrated [53].
Those interviewed people reported that the records on forest
landownership, the maps and the forest management plans
had simply vanished from the offices of the “forest econo-
mies” (Interviews 3 and 6). As a result of the unrecorded
property changes accumulated after the 80 s, the land titles
issued after the war recognised de facto landowners as being
the legal owners [53].
After the end of the war (June 10, 1999) the territory of
Kosovo was placed under the civil authority of the UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and under the
military authority of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). In June 1999,
the “forest economies” were re-established by the interna-
tional administration at the level of the municipalities. How-
ever, following the war disorder and the nine years of
inactivity the “forest economies” had very limited capacities
to perform forest management functions (Interviews 3, 14). In
this context, during the war period (1998e1999) and immedi-
ate post-war reconstruction (2000e2001), massive illegal log-
ging took place in the whole territory of Kosovo and
particularly in State forests (Interviews 7, 11, 30, 32, 42).
The 1987 Law on Forests was still in force by virtue of
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/59, amended by UNMIK Regula-
tionNo. 2000/17. In 2000, a new forestmanagement institution
was created. The Kosovo Forest Agency (KFA) was established
at the central level with six offices in the territory. In addition
to insufficient forest staff and a lack of technical means, the
KFA was faced with the problem of legitimisation in the eyes
of the municipalities, reluctant to recognize it, so far as it was
viewed as an institution imposed on themby the international
administration, in break with the traditionally decentralised
system of forest management (Interviews 3, 7, 14). The
establishment of the central forest agency was not without
reminding the municipalities of the experience of working
under the Serbian forest agency “Srbija Shume” (Interview 4,
7).
When the new Law on forests came into force in 2003, all
the rights granted to the municipalities after June 1999 were
abolished. The municipalities believed that the government
had deprived them of their “ownership” of the forests ([24],
Interviews 3, 4, 7, 14, 35). While de juremunicipalities have had
no role under the 2003 Law on forests de facto the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development has established officialTable 4 e The repartition of economic rights in post-war Koso







Access X X X
Withdrawal X X X
Management X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation No alienation rights No alienation rights No alienacooperation with municipalities and their respective forest
departments under a Memorandum of understanding [24].
Table 4 shows the evolution of the municipalities from the
position of proprietor (1999e2000) to than an authorised user
(after 2003), with no other rights than access and withdrawal.
Since 2003, Kosovo Forest Agency (KFA) has performed the
exclusion and management rights in State forests, which
qualifies it as “proprietor” in State forests. Additionally, KFA
performs exclusion rights (protection against timber theft)
and law implementation (issuing harvesting permits) in pri-
vate forests.
In July 2010, within the decentralisation process forecast in
the Ahtisaari plan (UN Security Council, 2007) a transfer of
public forest authority (worded as “forest competences” in the
official document) from KFA towards the municipalities
occurred. Thus the municipalities received a full “forest pro-
tection competence” (forest guarding against illegal logging,
prevention andmonitoring of damages, but also prevention of
forest pest, diseases and of forest fire) and partly the “forest
management competence”. The latter one, to be jointly un-
dertaken with the KFA, enables the implementation of forest
management plans and of the tendering procedures, the
monitoring of harvesting in private forests and the collection
of the revenues from the forest activities.
Within this new framework, the municipalities perform
the monitoring and guarding services on behalf of the State
(competence on forest protection fully transferred), for which
they are paid with the 30% of the revenues collected when
performing the competence on forest management. In the
eyes of the municipalities, the forest protection is not a
“competence” (a right) transferred, but a “duty” (an obliga-
tion). As claimed by a municipality representative (Interview
5), the municipality is not motivated to do the risky tax
collection in the forestry for only 30% return. Since 2010, both
KFA and municipalities play the role of proprietor, with
limited and overlapped abilities. New issues such sharing the
forestry income, transparency of money flow, control of the
forest resource, and organisation of tenders come to aggravate
the conflict between KFA and municipalities.
Analysing the distribution of rights in the post-communist
context, Weimer [35] identifies four characteristics of well-
defined property-rights systems: clarity of allocation, cost of
alienation, prevention of trespassing and credibility of
persistence. In the peculiar case of Kosovo State owned for-
ests, the allocation of exclusion and management rights is
unclear, being divided between one owner (State), two pro-














tion rights No alienation rights No alienation rights
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timber theft is the argument that the property rights are not
well defined [37]. It appears therefore that formalisation of the
property rights that is ensuring the legality of the title on the
land is not a sufficient condition for economic development
and sustainable use of resource, as discussed by Bromley [48]
for the developing countries. For instance, the structure of
legal rights over the forestland has little relevance to explain
the development of Kosovo system of fuelwood production.
The results of the study support the idea expressed by Cole
and Grossman [47] about the nature of the economic rights,
compared with the legal rights. They maintain that if the
economic rights are substituted for the legal rights in a soci-
ety, it is not because “mere doing signify hold a right” [47], but
because in the economic conditions of poor rural Kosovo it is
“socially acceptable” to do so. The situation is common to
some other former socialist countries [11,52,54], particularly
in South-Eastern Europe [4], yet here the magnitude of the
illegal logging is lower. In fact, in Europe, comparable high
incidence of the illegal logging was recorded in only few
former socialist countries, and for short periods of time
[11,54].
Given the current patterns of illegal logging, fuelwood
harvest in war and post-war periods in Kosovo poses the
classical open-access problem [55e57]: despite of existing
legal title on forestland, in most of the Kosovo forests the
fuelwood extraction follows the regime of open-access
resource. According to Barzel [37], for different reasons, e.g.
the high level of costs associated with enforcement, the
fuelwood is left in the “public domain” and then openly
accessed.
5.3. The evolution of the property rights enforcement
According to those interviewed, illegal logging before the war
was at a very low level due to “the efficient enforcement
procedures” (Interviews 4, 5, 6) that is convergent with the
enforcement situation recorded in socialist countries before
the change of the political regime [45,52]. The forest guardwas
obliged to have an accurate record of timber removal, and he
was liable on any missing tree (Interview 4, 12). Thus the levelFig. 1 e Institutional settings of law enof illegal logging was low, few quantities were stolen at once
and in very short time “the forest guard was able to know
where, how, who” (Interview 6, 35).
After the war, the law enforcement in general was difficult.
Not only were the forest authorities and managers, but also
UNMIK police and Courts, faced with particularly difficult
challenges in applying criminal procedure [58]. The most sig-
nificant weaknesses were proper to a post-war context: the
relatively rudimentary nature of Courts, insufficient salaries
for judicial and law enforcement staff, and the perception that
fundamental laws and procedures were imposed on Kosovo
people by the international administration without any
meaningful local consultation and input [59].
The enforcement system in forestry was progressively
built in the last decade being based on three levels of juris-
diction: local forest managers, central forest inspectors and
the Courts. The institutional settings in which regulation and
policies are enforced is stable since July 2010 (Fig. 1).
In the post-war period (1999e2003) themunicipalities were
supposed to perform enforcement, but theywere lacking basic
human and material capacities to do so (Interviews 3, 5, 17,
24). Since 2003, the Kosovo Forest Agency (KFA) has been
responsible for deterrence of illegal activities, in coordination
with the municipalities since July 2010. The local KFA and
municipal forest guards are still in a vulnerable position. They
are subject of threats from the illegal loggers, when not
involved themselves in illegal activities or paid to keep silent
(Interview 7, 15, 32). Also they lack the essential means of
enforcement, such as vehicles, mobile phones, or weapons
(Interviews 2, 13, 14, 17, 24, 27, 35). The six Kosovo forest in-
spectors, who serve as the second level jurisdiction, acted
within the mandate of the ministry until January 2012 when
they were transferred to the KFA so as to facilitate their
fieldwork. However, a conflict of interest became an issue in
relation to inspectors employed by KFA that would limit their
independence in performing law control (Interview 3, 6, 14).
Since then, several additional forest inspectors were hired by
the KFA.
The law enforcement performed by the forest guards and
inspectors against individuals is ineffective when the cases
enter the Courts litigation procedures. The forest guard mustforcement in Kosovo forest sector.
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y 6 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 2 5e4 3 4432attend each hearing “while the charged individual does not
even show up” (Interview 8), but “very few of those charged
will be sanctioned, or even they will be released after prom-
ising they will not break the law again” (Interview 9). In the
end, the cost of the forest guards' attendance to the Courts
hearings will be higher than that of the timber theft (Interview
11). Moreover, if the person is released, the damage will
remain uncovered, and the KFA will have to pay the judicial
procedure costs. Usually, the cases of forest law in-
fringements take three to four years to be completed (Inter-
view 8). Thus, in four years period (2005e2009), only 46 of the
25,745 requests for charges submitted to the Courts were
investigated [4]. Of course there are exceptions to the rule, e.g.
in Drenas County the Court has been assessed to be operative
in a timely fashion in resolving the cases (Interview 12).
Confronted with this situation, some innovative practices
have appeared as a simplified and shorter procedure of
enforcement. When the KFA representative has identified the
illegal logger, the proposed agreement is the recovering on the
spot of the damage caused in order to avoid the start of a Court
procedure (Interview 9). This practice has been described as
easier to implement than long-term Court litigation, yet it has
no legal basis and cannot avoid corruption of the controlling
staff (Interviews 8, 11, 16).
Thus, in general, in Kosovo, the prevention of trespassing
[35] is not ensured due to the ineffective forest guarding and
the time-consuming Court procedures. Demsetz [60] suggests
that a greater enforcement of the property rights will emerge
in response to a greater scarcity of the resource. Nevertheless
this scarcity should be perceived as such by the society [61]: by
the owners, forest managers, enforcement agencies, resource
users and the public at large. Some on-going processes such as
the elaboration of the National Action Plan to fight illegal
logging might be an indicator that policy-makers start to be
concerned with the sustainable supply of the population with
fuelwood. Also, the on-going commitment ofmunicipalities in
performing forest management may herald some progress.
However, the limited number of cases dealt with by the
Courts, implying almost invariably the release of the charged
persons, suggests that the Kosovo society does not perceive
yet that the forest resource is vanishing as shown by the re-
sults of the national forest inventory published in 2013 [25].6. Conclusion
The annual illegal fuelwood harvesting in Kosovo, largely
overcoming the sustainable extraction rates, represents a
market of up to 21.6 million euro and is done mostly by well-
organised groups of individuals, with market-oriented
behaviour. Post-war economic conditions and the gap be-
tween the fuelwood demand and the legal supply created
opportunities to illegal logging activities development. The
paper argues that the mismatch on economic property rights
arrangements is responsible for this situation. Thus the
decades-lasting dispute between the central agency and mu-
nicipalities in performing exclusion rights on timber extrac-
tion definitely weakened the Kosovo system of law
enforcement and left the fuelwood production be based on an
de facto open-access regime.Acknowledgements
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